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THE importance of the faculty of the Yale School of Law in the growth
of the JOuRNAL is manifest in the many products of their scholarship which
have been published in its pages. Their influence in the gradual development
in quality of the student sections is less evident but nonetheless very real.
In marking the fiftieth year of publication of the JOURNAL, the editors feel
privileged to devote the article and book review sections of this issue to con-
tributions from some of their teachers.
THE LIABILITIES OF THE IRREGULAR INDORSER
AN irregular (or anomalous) indorser is a person not otherwise a party
to a negotiable instrument who places his signature in blank upon the instru-
ment before delivery. For more than a century before the adoption of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, the liability he incurred proved an enigma to
the courts.' Ordinarily he was an accommodating party whose purpose in
signing was to induce a lender to extend credit to a borrower-;2 and like
1. It became common in France in the eighteenth century for an accommodating
party to write his name on the back of a negotiable instrument, or under the signature
of the party accommodated. Such an accommodating party %%as called an arl, and the
French law was quick to fix his liabilities. See POrmER, TRAIT DU COYrnAT DE CuAN:C
(1809) 28, 75, 181, 182. The aval has not been recognized in English law, BvY.zS, BILLS
OF EXCHAGE (20th ed. 1939) 173. But see Robinson v. Mann, 31 Can. S. C. R1 484
(1902); Grant v. Scott, 59 Can. S. C. R. 227 (1919).
2. One may be an accommodating indorser without being an irregular indur!er.
See Mechanics Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1071 1910, l , where thu ac-
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other accommodating parties he assumed an obligation the extent of which
was not discernible from the instrument itself. If the instrument were dis-
honored at maturity, his signature clearly made him liable to subsequent
holders for value, all of whom presumably had relied upon the presence of
his signature when they gave value for the note or bill.8 But only extrinsic
evidence could explain the full scope of his undertaking. Commonly it
divulged his intent to lend his name to the maker of a note or the drawer
or acceptor of a bill, and thus to increase the instrument's marketability.
And one who agreed to become the payee of the note or bill relied on the
additional security given the instrument by his signature. To such a person,
although a party whose indorsement normally preceded his own, the irregular
indorser was also liable.4 On the other hand, the evidence sometimes revealed
that the payee was the person for whose accommodation the irregular indorser
signed, in which case he was manifestly not liable to the payee.5
When it had been determined, by means of parol evidence, to whom the
irregular indorser had contracted an obligation, the courts had to decide the
further question of the content or terms of his obligation. It was the latter
question which proved to be the source of most confusion.; The location of
his signature on the back of the instrument gave rise to an immediate pre-
sumption that he was an indorser; and like an indorser he obligated himself
to subsequent holders. But the second function of an indorser, that of trans-
ferring title to another, he could not fulfill because he never had title to
the instrument, and his signature was wholly superfluous in the transfer of
title from one holder to another.
Since he could not be fitted into the category of an ordinary indorser, most
courts refused to confer upon him the ordinary indorsef's privileges, fore-
most of which is complete discharge from any obligation if the instrument
is not presented to the primary debtor at maturity and if prompt notice of
dishonor is not given the indorser.7 A majority of courts, prior to the
Negotiable Instruments Law, held that since he was never an obligee on
the instrument and was a party to it before the payee, he should be liable as
a co-maker.8 Others argued that the position of his signature and the fact
that he did not participate in the consideration made it clear that he was
commodating party was made the payee of a note which he immediately indorsed. Though
made purely to accommodate the maker, the indorsement was regular.
3. BIGELOw, BILLS, NoTES AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) § 251.
4. Id. §§ 252, 253.
5. Id. § 253a.
6. The confusion of the English courts was just as great. See 2 AMES, CASES ON
BILLS AND NoT s (1894) 839. See also Steele v. McKinlay, 5 App. Cases 754 (1880);
Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp. 447, 170 Engl. Rep. 1213 (1810).
7. 2 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) §§ 637, 1123.
8. Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90 (1877); Rey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341 (U. S.,
1859); First Nat. Bank v. Payne, 111 Mo. 291, 20 S. W. 41 (1892). See 2 DANIEL,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENlTS (7th ed. 1933) § 803, where the cases are collected.
[Vol. 50: 841
19411 LIABILITIES OF THE IRREGULAR INDORSER 843
not a maker; consequently he must be assumed to be a guarantor or surety.0
The trouble with each of these views was that it usually imposed upon the
irregular indorser an obligation different from the one he intended to assume.10
One who meant to be bound as co-maker, guarantor, or surety did not make
himself ostensibly an indorser. Recognizing this, some courts found him to
be a second indorser, the payee being the first." But this view also disre-
garded the intent of the parties, since it left the irregular indorser free from
liability to a payee who had demanded his signature as a condition precedent
to accepting the instrument from the borrower.
Most courts, appreciating the weaknesses of their positions, allowed parol
evidence to overcome their presumption that he was liable in a particular
capacity.12 In New York, which presumed him to be a second indorser,
the payee was permitted to show an agreement that the irregular indorser
be liable to him; and if he established this fact, the court indulged in the
pretense that the payee indorsed without recourse to the irregular indorser,
who negotiated the instrument back to him and was therefore liable to him,
as well as to subsequent holders.13 This reasoning was tortuous and fictional,
but it at least had the advantage of more nearly carrying out the intentions
of the parties. Other courts, however, were unwilling to sanction a com-
parable flight of fancy, with the result that their presumptions were almost
always conclusive, since it was only in rare cases that the parties had made
an agreement sufficiently explicit to overcome the existing presumption. 4
Parol evidence, in effect, was competent to resolve only one aspect of a
two-fold problem. Even in New York the result of allowing it to be shown
that an irregular indorser was a first, rather than the presumed second in-
dorser, was only to enlarge the number of parties to whom he was obligated;
the nature of his undertaking, that of an indorser, hence a party only con-
tingently liable, was not affected. It was to the end of making uniform the
character of the irregular indorser's undertaking that the relevant sections
of the Negotiable Instruments Law were directed.
9. Fullerton v. Hill, 48 Kan. 558, 29 Pac. 583 (1892) ; First Nat. Bank v. Babcock,
94 Cal. 96, 29 Pac. 415 (1892); Killian v. Ashley, 24 Ark. 511 (1867). See 2 D IEL,
NEG OTI LE INsRumENTs (7th ed. 1933) § 804.
10. See Comment (1910) 23 HARV. L. RE,. 396. An additional flaw in this theory
is that a guaranty is not negotiable; consequently the "guarantor's" liability should not
extend to later holders. See 1 AmEs, CASEs ox Bu.s AwD Nomrs (1894) 225, n. I.
11. Perry v. Friend, 57 Ark. 437, 21 S. W. 1065 (1893); Neal v. Wilson, 79 Ga.
736 (1887) ; See 2 DANim, NmorTAnLE IisTRUmENTs (7th ed. 1933) § 805.
12. See Comment (1910) 23 HAgv. L. Ryv. 396.
13. Coulter v. Richmond, 59 N. Y. 478 (1875) ; Moore v. Cross, 19 N. Y. 227 (1859);
Hall v. Newcomb, 7 Hill 416 (N. Y., 1844). See NoRToN, Bn.LS AND NoTs (4th ed.
1914) 185-187. There was no circuity of action, since the payee, although preceding the
irregular indorser, was not obligated to him. See Wilkinson v. Unwin, 7 Q. B. 636
(C. A., 1841).
14. In New Jersey an irregular indorsement created no presumption of any Lind.
Elliott v. Moreland, 69 N. J. L. 216, 54 Ad. 224 (1903).
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THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
The N.I.L. refers specifically to the irregular indorser in Section 64, which
provides:
"Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places
thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as an
indorser, in accordance with the following rules:
1. If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he
is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties.
2. If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer,
or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to
the maker or drawer.
3. If he signs for the accommodation of the payee, he is liable to
all parties subsequent to the payee."
The most important contribution of Section 64 is that it fixes conclusively
the nature of the irregular indorser's obligation.1" Its plain meaning is to
vest him with all the privileges and immunities, and to subject him to all
the liabilities, of an ordinary indorser. Most courts understood at once that
the rule was formal and that parol evidence was not admissible to show an
intent to be bound in any other capacity. 16 The reluctance of some courts
to forsake long-honored rules, however, has induced decisions which interpret
the statute as creating only a rebuttable presumption that the irregular
indorser is liable as an indorser,17 or as fixing a conclusive obligation only
with regard to subsequent holders for value.'8 These cases contradict the
15. Section 64 was fashioned after the California Code, which was chosen because
"It is conclusive to certainty and appears to accord more nearly to what must have been
the intention of the parties." Rule 2 was not in the California Code. CRAWFORD, ANNO-
TATED NEGoTLABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1916) 124.
Section 56 of the English Bills of Exchange Act provides: "Where a person signs
a bill otherwise than as drawer or acceptor, he thereby incurs the liabilities of an indorser
to a holder in due course." For illustrative English cases since the adoption of the B. E. A.,
see McCall Bros. v. Hargreaves [1932J 2 K. B. 423, 49 L. Q. Rev. 5 (1933) ; McDonald
& Co. v. Nash & Co. [1924] A. C. 625; Jenkins v. Coomber [1898] 2 Q. B. 168.
16. Ingalls v. Marston, 121 Me. 182, 116 At. 216 (1922); Baumeister v. Kuntz, 53
Fla. 340, 42 So. 886 (1907) ; Lightener v. Roach, 126 Md. 474, 95 Ad. 62 (1915). And an
allegation and evidence of the irregular indorser's intention to be liable to the payee are
unnecessary. Far Rockaway Bank v. Norton, 186 N. Y. 484, 79 N. E. 709 (1906); Wil-
son v. Hendee, 74 N. J. L. 640, 66 At. 413 (1907) ; Miller v. Hockley, 80 F. (2d) 980
(C. C. A. 4th, 1936). The cases are collected in BRANNAN, NEGOTIAB INSTRUME]NTS
LAW (6th ed. 1938) 784.
17. Hardy v. Ouachita Nat. Bank, 165 Ark. 532, 265 S.W. 74 (1924); VanKleck
v. Channon, 175 Ill. App. 626 (1912); Lee v. Boykin, 114 S. C. 480, 103 S. E. 777
(1920) ; Mercantile Bank v. Busby, 120 Tenn. 652, 113 S. W. 390 (1908) ; cf. Pharr v.
Stevens, 124 Tenn. 669, 139 S.W. 730 (1911). See also Crawford v. Rawls, 6 La. App.
372 (1927).
18. Long v. Gwin, 202 Ala. 358, 80 So. 440 (1918). See Comment (1925) 11 VA. L.
REV. 222.
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obvious intent of the statute, and they destroy that hope for uniformity which
was its motivating impulse.
Under the statute the nature of the irregular accommodating indorser's
undertaking, like that of other accommodating parties, is revealed by the
instrument itself.19 And in the unusual case in which the borrower signs
as the irregular indorser with the accommodating party becoming the maker
or acceptor, the irregular indorser, while not entitled to presentment and
notice,20 is nonetheless an indorser, and is obligated as such.2 ' Presentment
and notice are dispensed with in this case only because, as the principal
debtor, the irregular indorser- like a regular indorser who is the principal
debtor-must be aware that the instrument will not be paid when presented
at maturity.
22
Furthermore, an accommodating party may incur the obligations of an
indorser although he does not sign on the back of the instrument.m Sec-
tion 63 provides:
"A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise
than as maker, drawer, or acceptor, is deened to be an indorser,
unless he dearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be
bound in some other capacity."
Although this section is much quoted by the courts as fixing the irregular
indorser's liability to be that of an indorser,2 4 it is, because of Section 64,
superfluous in this connection.25 Its chief utility, at least with regard to the
irregular indorser before delivery, is to provide a rule for deciding cases in
which the purpose of the accommodating party's signature is controvertible.
Thus, where an officer of a corporation places his name on an instrument,
he is held to be an indorser, unless it is clear upon the instrument itself that
he signed as agent of the corporation maker or drawer.20 And where the
19. This is criticized by Hening, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Is It
Producing Uniformity and Certainty in the Law .ferchant? (1911) 59 U. OF PA. L
REV. 471, 532, 551.
20. See N. I. L. §§ 80, 115(3).
21. See Comment (1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 306. See Park Bank v. Naffah, 276 Pa. 199,
119 AtI. 923 (1923) ; Bergen v. Grimble, 130 Md. 559, 101 At. 137 (1917).
22. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (6th ed. 1938) 865-867.
23. O'Dess v. Gunter, 258 Mich. 667, 242 N. W. 804 (1932); People's Bank v.
Penello, 59 Cal. App. 174, 210 Pac. 432 (1922); Germania Nat. Bank v. Mariner, 129
Wis. 544, 109 N. W. 574 (1906). Section 17(6) of the N. I. L. should also be noted:
"Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity
the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed to be an indorser."
24. See, for example, Deahy v. Choquet, 28 R. I. 338, 67 At. 421 (1907) ; Bradley
v. Louisville Food Products Co., 139 Md. 385, 114 At. 913 (1921).
25. It is significant that Crawford, who drafted the N. I. L., specifically declares
§ 64 to have been designed for the irregular indorser, and that he omits any reference to
the irregular indorser under § 63. CRAAWiORD, ANNOrATm NEGOTIAB.E INsTIful.TNs
LAw (4th ed. 1916) 124.
26. Eaves v. Keeton, 196 Mo. App. 424, 193 S. W. 629 (1917) ; Cooper v. Sonk, 201
Mich. 655, 167 N. W. 842 (1918) ; Steffens v. Sinkey, 43 Ohio App. 355, 183 N. E. 856
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accommodating party adds words which are ambiguous or contradictory,
Section 63 determines that he is an indorser.
2 7
Some courts have gone even further and declared that even where the
accommodating party has stated explicitly that he is guaranteeing payment,
he is liable as an indorser if he has signed on the back of the instrument.
2 8
The passion for uniformity need not be carried to such lengths. Unlike the
case where the payee guarantees payment to subsequent holders, the signature
of an accommodating party before delivery need not be termed an indorse-
ment, since it is the payee's signature, not his, which negotiates the instru-
ment.2 9 There seems no reason, therefore, for distorting the accommodator's
intent where he has expressed it clearly on the instrument, 0 and Section 63
provides for this kind of case.31
To Whom the Irregular Indorser is Liable. Most of the confusion regarding
the irregular indorser today may be attributed to the failure of the courts to
distinguish between what was and what was not changed by Section 64. The
provision that the irregular indorser is liable as an indorser, if at all, was new.
But the belief of early commentators on the N.I.L., that the three rules set
forth in Section 64 eliminated all presumptions and excluded any need for
parol evidence,32 was an illusion. Instead, these rules only illustrate the con-
(1932), (1933) 7 U. or CIN. L. Rav. 187. But the words of § 64, "not otherwise a
party," do not change the rule that a partner indorsing individually is a party different
from the partnership and incurs a double liability arising from the two distinct contracts
by which he has bound himself. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Mead, 216 Mass, 521, 104 N. E.
377 (1914).
27. In Seabury v. Hungerford, 2 Hill 80 (N. Y., 1841), the defendant added to his
signature the word "backer," and was held liable as an indorser. Cf. Merchants'
Bank v. Raesly, 288 Pa. 374, 136 Atl. 238 (1927); Mangold v. Utterback, 54 Okla. 655,
160 Pac. 713 (1916), 16 COL L. REv. 429.
28. Douglas v. Rumelin, 125 Ore. 261, 264 Pac. 852 (1928); cf. Bradford v. Corey,
5 Barb 461 (N. Y., 1849); Wallrich Land & Lumber Co. v. Ebenreiter, 216 Wis. 140,
256 N. W. 773 (1934). See 2 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRU2tENTS (7th ed. 1933) §§ 796,
797.
29. See Arant, The Written Aspect of Indorsement (1924) 34 YALE. L. J. 144. See
also Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Word More (1901) 14 HARv. L. Ray.
442, 445.
30. The intent must be dearly indicated in the indorsement and cannot be shown
by parol evidence. Smardon v. Broussard, 6 La. App. 579 (1927); Busbee v. Creech,
192 N. C. 499, 135 S. E. 326 (1926) ; First Nat. Bank v. Bickel, 143 ICy. 754, 137 S. W.
790 (1911).
31. The more persuasive cases so hold. Carothers v. Callahan, 207 Ala, 611, 93 So.
569 (1922); Bonart v. Rabito, 141 La. 970, 76 So. 166 (1917); Hibernia Nat. Bank v.
Dresser, 132 La. 532, 61 So. 561 (1913); Conn v. Atkinson, 227 Ky. 594, 13 S. W. (2d)
759 (1929); BRANNAw, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS- LAw (6th ed. 1938) 792.
32. Hening, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Is It Producing Uniformity
And Certainty In the Law Merchant? (1911) 59 U. oF PA. L. REv. 471, 532; Chafee,
Progress of the Law-Bills And Notes (1919) 33 HARV. L. Rav. 255, 262; NORTON,
BILLS AND NOTES (4th ed. 1914) 189-191; (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 187.
[Vol. 50: 841
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tinuing need for parol evidence to determine the parties to whom the irregular
indorser is liable.
Thus, Rule 3 constitutes a necessary exception to Rule 1, an exception
which is dependent upon the existence of specific facts which can be shown
only by extrinsic evidence.33 An irregular indorsement appearing first on
the back of a note, for example, may have been made to give the maker
credit with the payee,34 or to give the payee credit with his transferee.m
Rule 3 provides that if the irregular indorser signs for the accommodation
of the payee, he is not liable to the payee. Yet there is nothing on the
ordinary instrument to indicate for whose accommodation he did lend his
name.36 Furthermore, Section 64 is silent regarding the status of an ir-
regular indorser who signs for the accommodation of a holder about to
negotiate. Again, only extrinsic evidence can disclose which is the accom-
modated party.3 7 Similarly, where the principal debtor, rather than the ac-
commodating party, becomes the irregular indorser, he is not entitled to
notice under Section 115(3); but extrinsic evidence is required to show
that he is in fact the principal debtor.38
Because of faulty draftsmanship, parol evidence is also needed under Rule 2
to determine to whom the irregular indorser is liable. This was made
apparent in Haddock, Blanclard & Co. v. Haddock,39 an early case under
the N.I.L. There the lender drew a bill of exchange on the borrower to
his own order. Before its acceptance the bill was indorsed in blank by the
defendant for the accommodation of the borrower-drawee. Under the terms
of Rule 2 the defendant was not liable to the drawer, although it was clear
that the drawer agreed to extend credit only because the defendant was willing
to back the bill as an indorser. The New York court, realizing the defect
in the statute, held that parol evidence was admissible to show that the ir-
regular indorser was liable to the drawer.40
33. See BRAxNAw, NEGoTiABL INsRtENTs LAW (6th ed. 1938) 796-797.
34. See, for example, Franklin v. Kidd, 219 N. Y. 409, 114 N. E. 839 (1916).
35. Franco v. Schwartz, 131 Misc. 74, 225 N. Y. Supp. 739 (Sup. Ct. 128); State
Bank v. Pangerl, 139 Minn. 19, 165 N. ,V. 479 (1917).
36. For a case illustrating the possible difficulty of finding which is the accommo-
dated party, see Perley v. Wing, 82 N. H. 299, 133 At. 26 (1926).
37. Hilgemeier v. Bower Mfg. Co., 81 Ind. App. 191, 139 N. E. 691 (1923).
38. Gillam v. Walker, 189 N. C. 189, 126 S. E. 424 (1925); Residence Funding Co.
v. Francis, 149 Misc. 380, 268 N. Y. Supp. 239 (Mun. Ct. 1933). Contra: Busbee v.
Creech, 192 N. C. 499, 135 S. E. 326 (1926), criticized adversely in Comment (1927)
13 VA. L. Rxv. 306. See also Overland Auto Co. v. Winters, 277 Mo. 425, 210 S. W.
1 (1919).
39. 192 N. Y. 499, 85 N. E. 682 (1908), 19 L. R. A. (m.s.) 136, 22 H,%nv. L.
Rv. 300.
40. The error in the statute and the situation presented by the Haddock case were
foreseen by Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Word More (1901) 14 HAM.
L. REv. 442, 446.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Various amendments to Rule 2 have been suggested, designed to circum-
vent the situation presented by the Haddock case, 41 but they have not been
widely adopted. 42 Where the instrument is a note the wording of the Rule
is sound, and parol evidence need not be admitted. It should be noted, how-
ever, that a note within Rule 2 (or a bill within a properly amended Rule
2) does not require parol evidence only because an instrument naming the
maker as payee could only be made for the accommodation of the maker.
Whenever the payee is a third person, the form of the instrument cannot
disclose to whom the irregular indorser is liable.
The Irregular Indorser After Delivery. Before the adoption of the N.I.L.
it was part of the prima facie case of a payee seeking to recover against an
irregular indorser to prove that the indorsement was placed on the instru-
ment before it was delivered to him. 43 The basis of the requirement was
the need for finding some consideration which passed to the irregular in-
dorser 44 upon which his liability could be predicated.40 The statute preserves
the need for a valid consideration 46 by limiting the liabilities created by
Section 64 to the irregular indorser before delivery.
41
Not being covered explicitly by the statute, the status of the irregular
indorser after delivery has called up the ghosts of the controversy which
41. It was suggested by Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1900) 14 HARV.
L. REv. 241, 250, that the first two rules of § 64 be amended to read as follows: "(1) If
the instrument is a note or bill payable to the order of a third person, or an accepted bill
payable to the order of the drawer, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent par-
ties. (2) If the instrument is a note or unaccepted bill payable to the order of the maker
or drawer, or payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or
drawer." See also Brannan, Some Necessary Amendments to the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 588, 589.
42. Only Illinois, Virginia, and West Virginia have adopted the amendments advised
by Ames. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 37.
43. Barnes v. Van Keuren, 31 Neb. 165, 47 N. W. 848 (1891); Anderson v. Nor-
vill, 10 Ill. App. 240 (1881); see (1913) 44 L. R. A. (N.s.) 481.
44. It has never been clear whether the nature of this consideration consisted of
the value transferred from the lender to the borrower, or whether it was the borrower's
promise to save the irregular indorser harmless if he should have to take up the instru-
ment. Compare Carr v. Wainwright, 43 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) with Murphey
v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 57 Neb. 519, 77 N. W. 1102 (1899).
45. The statement in 1 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE IN TRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) 713, that
at common law a presumption existed that the indorsement was made before delivery,
is very questionable. See Marienthal v. Taylor, 2 Minn. 147 (1858).
46. Ladd v. Anderson, 89 S. W. (2d) 1041 (Tex., 1935); Kahn v. Waldman, 283
Mass. 391, 186 N. E. 587, 88 A. L. R. 699 (1933) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Ellwood, 200
Iowa 1213, 206 N. W. 256 (1925), (1926) 12 IowA L. REv. 69; Jackson v. Lancaster,
213 Ala. 97, 104 So. 19 (1925).
47. Kohn v. Consolidated Butter & Egg Co., 30 Misc. 725, 63 N. Y. Supp. 265 (Sup.
Ct. 1900). And it remains part of the plaintiff's prima facie case to prove that the in-
dorsement was made before delivery. Bender v. Bahr Trucking Co., 144 App. Div. 742,
129 N. Y. Supp. 737 (1911); Kimball State Bank v. Kimball Mills, 55 S. D. 551, 226
N. W. 757 (1929).
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formerly centered around the irregular indorser before delivery, and the
courts have variously called him a guarantor,48 a joint maker,49 and an in-
dorser.50 Uniformly, however, they have admitted parol evidence to show
the scope of his undertaking. Where the evidence discloses that, although
made after the delivery to the lender, the indorsement was part of the agree-
ment by which the lender agreed to extend credit and that the irregular
indorser should therefore be liable to the lender, the better rule is that the
indorsement relates back to the time of the making of the instrument.51 In
this case a valid consideration clearly passes, and the irregular indorser is
properly treated exactly as though he had indorsed before delivery.. 2 More
commonly, however, the evidence reveals an intent to accommodate the
lender, in dealing with his transferee 5 3 and this gives rise to the problem
of determining in what capacity the irregular indorser after delivery shall
be bound.
Most courts have endeavored to bring this situation within Section 6 4.51
To do so it is necessary to hold that each indorsement creates a new instru-
ment, with the original payee becoming the "maker" and his indorsee be-
coming the "payee"; hence, the irregular indorser signs before the "new
instrument" is delivered to the "new payee" and is duly liable to him. If
the original payee transfers the instrument by a special indorsement, the case
falls within Rule 1 of Section 64. And if he transfers it by an indorsement
in blank, the "new instrument" is payable to the bearer, and the case comes
within Rule 2, which makes the irregular indorser liable to the bearer.55
The catch-all terms of Section 63 offer a more forthright solution. Just as
Section 64 applies to the irregular indorser before delivery, the argument
runs, so Section 63 determines that the irregular indorser after delivery is
liable as an indorser.56 And by analogy to Section 64, parol evidence may
48. Kahn v. Waldman, 283 Mass. 391, 186 N. E. 587 (1933); Gursky v. Rosenberg,
105 Cal. App. 410, 287 Pac. 575 (1930); Loveland v. Sigel-Campion Live Stock Co.,
77 Colo. 22, 234 Pac. 168 (1925) ; Cripple Creek State Bank v. Rollestone, 70 Colo. 434,
202 Pac. 115 (1921).
49. Babel v. Ransdell, 294 S. W. 734 (Mo. 1927); Ryan v. Security Savings Bank,
271 Fed. 366 (App. D. C. 1921).
50. Thomas v. Hoebel, 46 Idaho 744, 271 Pac. 931 (1928) ; Morris C'ty Brick Co.
v. Austin, 79 N. J. L. 273, 75 Atl. 550 (1910); Harris v. Patterson, 138 Okla. 57, 280
Pac. 434 (1929); Alexander v. Young, 65 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
51. Baggish v. Offengand, 97 Conn. 312, 116 AtI. 614 (1922) ; Burton v. McCaskill,
79 Fla. 173, 83 So. 919 (1920) ; Downey v. O'Keefe, 26 R. 1. 571, 59 At. 929 (1905);
Pearl v. Cortwright, 81 Miss. 300, 33 So. 72 (1902).
52. Krumm v. El Reno State Bank, 83 Okla. 177, 201 Pac. 364 (1921).
53. See, for example, Goodman v. Gaull, 244 Mass. 528, 138 N. E. 910 (1923).
54. See, for exaniple, Kimball State Bank v. Kimball Mills, 55 S. D. 551, 226 N. W.
757 (1929).
55. Or the holder may convert the blank indorsement into a special indorsement and
thus bring the case within § 64(1). See N. I. L. §35.
56. Thomas v. Hoebel, 46 Idaho 744, 271 Pac. 931 (1928) ; Morris C'ty Brick Co.
v. Austin, 79 N. J. L. 273, 75 Atl. 550 (1910).
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be admitted to show to whom he is liable. This reaches the desired result
without allowing parol evidence under a rule which was intended to exclude it.
The Irregular Indorser's Warranties. The irregular indorser, because he
undertakes the obligations of the ordinary indorser, is liable not only on his
broad engagement to pay if the instrument is dishonored at maturity and
he is duly notified; he may also be held on the general warranties imputed
to every indorser by Section 66.5 7 To some it has seemed an anomaly that
an accommodation party could warrant anything,58 but much of the difficulty
disappears when it is understood that this is only an affirmative way of saying
that he is estopped to deny the matters enumerated in Section 66.50 The
principal effect of the warranties is to prevent the indorser from setting up
as a personal defense any defect in the original contract as embodied in the
instrument,60 although they also give the holder an alternative cause of action
57. By § 66 and the warranties adopted from § 65, every indorser warrants that:
(1) the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; (2) he has good
title to it; (3) all prior parties had capacity to contract; (4) the instrument is at the
time of his indorsement valid and subsisting. "And, in addition, he engages that on due
presentment, it shall be accepted or paid . . . and that if it be dishonored, and the neces-
sary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder,
or to any subsequent indorser, who may be compelled to pay it." It is obviously impos-
sible, however, for an irregular accommodation indorser to warrant that he has good title
to the instrument.
58. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1900) 14 HARv. L. Ray. 241, 250-251.
Brewster acknowledged that § 66 "does make a change in the law, but it is in the line
of aiding negotiability," Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1900)
10 YALE L. J. 84, 94.
59. McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1902) 50 Am. L. REG. (o.s.)
561, 567. The English courts have always used the "estoppel" rather than the "war-
ranty" argument. Ex parte Clark, 3 Brown C. R. 238 (1791) ; Thicknesse v. Bromilow,
2 Gr. & J. 425 (1832) ; Burchfield v. Moore, 23 L. J. Q. B. 261 (1854). See BIGr.ow,
BiLLs, NOrES AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) §§ 299-302. And under the Bills of Exchange
Act the indorser "engages" that the bill will be accepted and paid, etc., and "is pre-
cluded from denying" the genuineness of the bill, etc. See B. E. A. § 55. The cases are
collected in BYL..s, BnLLs OF EXCHANGE (20th ed. 1939).
60. Myrtilles v. Johnson, 124 Conn. 177, 199 Atl. 115 (1938) ; Segar v. Ocean Ave.
Realty Corp., 127 Misc. 805, 217 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1926), 26 COL. L. REv. 1035;
Packard v. Windholz, 88 App. Div. 365, 84 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1903). But see Susque-
hanna Valley Bank v. Loomis, 85 N. Y. 207 (1881) ; Atlas Coal Co. v. Kentucky River
Coal Co., 253 IIl. App. 475 (1929). The cases are collected in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 813-828.
As to a surety's right to set off his principal's claims against the debtor, see Arant,
Claims Against the Debtor As Defenses To The Surety (1930) 29 MIcH. L. Rav. 135;
Levine, The Principal's Warranty And Offset Claims Against the Creditor As Defenses
To The Surety (1931) 30 MICH. L. REv. 197. See also Clark Car Co. v. Clark, 48 F.
(2d) 169 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931); Walker v. Traylor Mfg. Co., 12 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926); Coffelt v. Wise, 62 Ind. 451 (1878); Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N. Y. 306
(1862).
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against the indorser. 1 Thus, where an irregular indorser is sued by the
holder of a note, proof that the maker's signature was forged does not con-
stitute a valid defense for the indorser.
0 2
The more important problem peculiar to the irregular indorser in cun-
nection with warranties is whether the provision of Section 66, that the
warranties run to "all subsequent holders in due course," ' 3 excludes the
payee of a note or bill, so that the irregular indorser may use against him real
defenses which are available to the maker or drawer. The irregular indurser
is, of course, liable on his broad engagement to pay whether or not the payee
is a holder in due course, but it is sometimes held that since the instrument
has not been negotiated to him, the payee cannot be a holder in due cuurbe.
Consequently the irregular indorser is not liable to him on a warranty basis,"
and cannot be sued by him until the date of maturity. Such a result, based
on the shadowy and controversial concept of "holder in due course,"65 is
exceedingly dubious in view of the express affirmation of Section 64 that
an irregular indorser is liable as an indorser. It ignores the fact that for all
practical purposes the payee stands in the same relation to the irregular
indorser as a subsequent holder in due course stands to the ordinary indorserco
Wiser courts have held that the issuance of the instrument to the payee
constitutes a sufficient negotiation, and the definition of "holder in due
course," found in Section 52, in no way contradicts such an interpretation.67
Section 52, however, does require that a holder, to be a holder in due course,
must be "without notice of any infirmity in the instrument." Thus, one who
agrees to extend credit only on condition that he be made the payee of a
note bearing a usurious rate of interest cannot be a holder in due course able
61. BIGELoW, B=S, NOTES AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) § 299. The indorser may
be held for breach of warranty although there has been neither presentment nor season-
able notice. Turnbull v. Bowyer, 40 N. Y. 456 (1869).
62. Security Trust Co. v. Giglio, 132 Ad. 651 (N. J., 1926) ; Shepherd v. Mortgage
Security Corp., 139 Va. 274, 123 S. E. 553 (1924) ; See also President of Bank v. Davis,
36 Mass. 373 (1837).
63. Ames said the idea that an indorser is liable to any one but his immediate trans-
feree "is an original invention of the Negotiable Instruments Law." Ames, The Nego-
tiable Instruments Law (1900) 14 HAav. L. Rav. 241, 251. But see McKeehan, The
Negotiable Instruments Law (1902) 50 Am. L. RE. (o.s.) 561, 565-568.
64. Gate City Nat. Bank v. Bunton, 316 M6o. 1338, 296 S. IV. 375 (1927); Walker
v. Traylor Mfg. Co., 12 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Farmers State Bank v.
Mowry, 107 Okla. 275, 232 Pac. 26 (1924); Southern Nat. Life Co. v. People's Bank,
178 Ky. 80, 198 S. WV. 543 (1917) ; Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, 135 Iowa 350, 112 N. W.
807 (1907).
65. Moore, The Rights of a Remitter of a Bill or Note (1920) 20 Co. L Rv.
749. See Britton, The Payee as a Holder in Due Course (1934) 1 U. oF. Cni L. Rzy.
728.
66. See Johnston v. Knipe, 260 Pa. 504, 105 AUt. 705 (1918).
67. Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462, 105 N. F_. 605 (1914); McDonough
v. Cook, 19 Ont. L. Rep. 267 (1903).
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to hold the irregular indorser for breach of warranty, 8 since he must know
that a usurious note may be void.60 But this creates no inconsistency, since
the same rule applies to a subsequent holder seeking to recover from the
ordinary indorser who negotiated the instrument to him.
70
Other courts, reluctant to call the initial issuance of an instrument tanta-
mount to a negotiation, have pointed out that while the warranties of Section
66 run to "all subsequent holders in due course," they do not run only to
them.7' This is an equally satisfactory theory on which to hold the irregular
indorser liable to the payee, but it necessitates the use of an estoppel argu-
ment to prevent the payee who knows of the defect at the time he accepts
the instrument from enjoying a greater protection than the subsequent holder.
Order of Liability. The rule of Section 68 that "indorsers are liable prima
facie in the order in which they indorse" applies to irregular indorsers; 72
and, like ordinary indorsers, they may introduce evidence to show a contrary
agreement among themselves.738 Moreover, a sufficient agreement among two
or more irregular indorsers that they shall be jointly liable may be found
from the circumstances under which they signed,74 although it is not enough
that each knew that the other was signing for the accommodation of the
same person.
75
The unfortunate wording of the second sentence of Section 68 gives rise
to the more serious problems arising under this Section. The provision that
"joint payees or joint indorsees who indorse are liable jointly and severally"
excludes joint accommodating indorsers and strongly implies that they are
liable only jointly.76 Why the common law rule should have been changed
for all except joint accommodating indorsers is enigmatic, 77 although the
68. Sedbury v. Duffy, 158 N. C. 432, 74 S. E. 355 (1912); Bruck v. Lambeck, 63
Misc. 117, 118 N. Y. Supp. 494 (City Ct. 1909); Burke v. Smith, 111 Md. 624, 75 Aft.
114 (1909) ; cf. Moffett v. Bickle, 21 Gratt. 280 (Va., 1871). See also Sabine v. Paine,
223 N. Y. 401, 119 N. E. 849 (1918), holding that a usurious instrument is void.
69. But where a subsequent holder, without notice of the instrument's infirmity,
brings suit, the instrument is valid. McNeill v. Lilly, 82 F. (2d) 620 (App. D. C. 1935);
Wachovia Nat. Bank v. Crafton, 181 N. C. 404, 107 S. E. 316 (1921).
70. See BRANNAN, NEoTiABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (6th ed. 1938) 574-583.
71. Id. 815.
72. Blumberg v. Speilberger, 209 Ala. 278, 96 So. 191 (1923) ; Noble v. Beeman-
Spaulding-Woodward Co., 65 Ore. 93, 131 Pac. 1006, 46 L. R. A. (N.s.) 162 (1913).
See CRAWFOr, ANNOTATED NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (3d ed. 1908) 92.
73. Witteman v. Sands, 238 N. Y. 434, 144 N. E. 671 (1924), (1925) 38 HtAv. L.
Ray. 391; Wilson v. Hendee, 74 N. J. L. 640, 66 At. 413 (1907); Prestenback v. Man-
sur, 14 La. App. 429, 125 So. 310 (1929).
74. Quackenboss v. Harbaugh, 298 Mo. 240, 249 S. W. 940 (1923); Trego v, Est.
of Cunningham, 267 Ill. 367, 108 N. E. 350 (1915); Weeks v. Parsons, 176 Mass. 570,
58 N. E. 157 (1900) ; -cf. Emmons v. Deorgin, 125 Me. 485; 135 Atl. 98 (1926); Jaronko
v. Czerwinski, 117 Conn. 15, 166 Ad. 388 (1933).
75. In re McCord, 174 Fed. 72 (S. D. N. Y. 1909).
76. Case v. McKinnis, 107 Ore. 223, 213 Pac. 422, 32 A. L. R. 167 (1923); cf. Wil-
liams v. Paintsville, 143 Ky. 781, 137 S. W. 535 (1911).
77. See Comment (1925) 11 CORN. L. Q. 57.
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rule possesses some virtues. It protects the irregular indorser who was not
notified from being deprived of the privileges of the transferor indorser, in-
cluding the right to notice.78 It likewise prevents the one joint indorier who
did get notice from being obligated to pay the whole amount. 0 But the
effect of Section 68 is to create an unwelcome distinction between the ir-
regular and the transferor indorser. Even more important is the notable
unfairness of the rule to the innocent holder for value who, being unable
to tell from the form of the instrument that the several indorsers are juint
accommodating parties, gives notice only to the one on whose credit he had
relied and unwittingly discharges all.80 Equally unjust is the corollary that
where one of two joint accommodation indorsers waives notice, buth are
discharged if notice is not given the other.
8 '
A solution is suggested by Section 107, which allows a joint accommoda-
tion indorser who receives notice the same time for giving notice to his
co-indorsers as the holder has after the dishonor.82 If, therefore, the im-
plication of Section 68-that joint irregular indorsers are liable only jointly
- be disregarded, the irregular indorser who is given notice is enabled to
obtain a proportionate contribution from his co-indorsers by notifying them.
They in turn receive the notice to which they are entitled as indorsers. And
at the same time the innocent holder is relieved from the unreasonable burden
of having to discover whether the indorser upon whose credit he relied is
in fact one of several joint indorsers.
83
Conclusion. The sections of the N.I.L. which deal with the irregular
indorser have not escaped astute criticism from those who are ever ready
with suggestions for amending the statute. A larger portion of the blame
for the present lack of uniformity, however, must rest upon those courts
that have failed to find in the present statute a workable framework upon
which they might build the rules for deciding specific cases. The cases recog-
nizing the character of the irregular indorser's undertaking offer ample proof
that such a framework is provided by the statute in its present form.
78. But see Owens v. Grenlee, 68 Colo. 114, 188 Pac. 721 (1920).
79. See Blair v. Wells, 156 Ark. 470, 246 S. IV. 498 (1923).
80. See discussion in Case v. McKinnis, 107 Ore. 223, 213 Pac. 422, 32 A. L. R. 167
(1923).
81. First Nat. Bank of Ludington v. fichigan-Ark Oil Corp., 231 Mich. 597, 204
N. NV. 719 (1925), (1926) 12 IowA L. Rv. 175. As to what constitutes a waiver, see,
for example, Glidden v. Chamberlain, 167 Mass. 486, 46 N. E. 103 (1897) ; Whitney v.
Chadsey, 216 fich. 604, 185 N. IV. 826 (1921); Bank of Montpelier v. Montpelier Lum-
ber Co., 16 Idaho 730, 102 Pac. 685 (1909).
82. Section 107 provides: "Where a party receives notice of dishonor, he has, after
the receipt of such notice, the same time for giving notice to antecedent parties that the
holder has after the dishonor."
83. Hurlbut v. Quigley, 180 Cal. App. 265, 180 Pac. 613 (1919); Shea v. Vahey,
215 Mass. 82, 102 N. E. 119 (1913) ; see Enterprise Co. v. Canning, 210 Mass. 2M5, 96
N. E. 673 (1911).
